Ethics and language in Wittgenstein

Vera Fisogni

I. 1. Introduction

Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, can clarify the propositions of natural sciences but – as well as theoretical activity – it can’t pretend to say anything about the problem of life. It follows therefore that, in the domain of language – everyday language – there’s no place for propositions dealing with ethic-moral (Wittgenstein, as we’ll see in the next paragraph, uses these terms as synonyms) or metaphysical issues. As his friend and master Bertrand Russell noticed in the famous introduction to the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, all the ethic matters are located by Wittgenstein in the region of “mystic” and ineffable1.

But Russell himself couldn’t help expressing, at the same time, his “intellectual discomfort” because Wittgenstein, in spite of his main idea of an ethics that “cannot be put in words”, nevertheless, was able to “communicate his ethical opinions”. The disconcert expressed by Russell – probably shared by many readers of the Tractatus at least in a very intuitive way – should be accurately re-considered, in order to throw a new light on morality in Wittgenstein and, perhaps, on moral philosophy in general.

We argue that, in the Tractatus (as well in the Notebooks), the ineffability of ethical propositions doesn’t mean an ineffability of ethics at all. In fact, as we’re going to prove in the next paragraphs, the necessity of a correct speech/language expressed by the Tractatus propositions – basic condition to deal with the world and its sense – is not only the core of Wittgenstein’s moral philosophy but it gives back a sort of “effability”2 to the ineffable ethics.

In Wittgenstein’s thought we face two levels of ethics:

- the one of ethical propositions, that can only be shown but not said and cannot put into words
- the one of moral-ethical use of language, marked by formal and logical correctness.

Our interpretation doesn’t intend to point out a contradiction in Wittgenstein’s lesson, but to reconsider the main issues of ethics and mystic. We could face a contradiction

---

1 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus was published for the first time in 1921. The German version was titled “Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung” and appeared on the “Annalen der Naturphilosophie”. The English translation came the following year, 1922. Version by Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930) and Charles Kay Ogden (1889-1957). Wittgenstein disapproved Russell’s introduction. A recent analysis of Russell’s intellectual disconcern may be read in Vera Fisogni, “Morale e linguaggio in Wittgenstein. Il riscatto della metafisica”, in A Parte Rei, Madrid, July 2001. (http://aparterei.com/page25.html)

2 The word effability is not included in the Oxford advanced dictionary of current English, by A. S. Hornby. Anyway the sense it easy to understand: it means the opposite of ineffable. Poet T. S. Eliot uses “effable” in The poem of classical cats. “When you notice a cat in profound meditation/the reason I’ll tell you is always the same/his mind is engaged in a rapt contemplation/ of the thought of the thought of the thought of his name/his ineffable, effineffable/deep and singular inscrutable name”.

http://aparterei.com
only if we’d intend the word “mystic” in religious terms: in fact, if we consider the mystic as the experience of a union with God, it comes out that ethics is not only ineffable, but also not of this world. But that’s not exactly what Wittgenstein expressed in the *Tractatus* and, some years before, in the *Notebooks*.

Mystic notably refers to the concept of over-substantiality, a logical-metaphisical-theological idea that shows similarities with Pseudo-Dyonisian thought, as we’ll show by comparing the two authors. In this perspective (and logic at the same time) it is easy to understand why ethics – as it arises from the reading of the *Tractatus* — offer itself both as transcendent structure of world-language as well as transcendental condition of it. It is ineffable on the front of language, but at the same time a fundamental root of the language and the world’s representation.

I. 2. Speaking as a moral act

The *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* ends with a proposition as famous as difficult to understand and open to a wide range on interpretations (“Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen”—“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”, translation by Frank Plumpton Ramsey and Charles Ogden, 1922)³. We move from it to go through ethics in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Our argumentation is aimed at these three goals:

1) going further the most current explanations of the 7th proposition (traditionally considered as the *de profundis* of classical metaphysics)⁴,

2) showing that the ineffability of ethical propositions, firmly declared by Wittgenstein is not acceptable at all, because – as I intend to prove – every speech for the Wiener thinker is ethical in its proper making, when it is correctly performed,

3) this conclusion is based on a crucial argument: the possibility of a speech is given only when there are the condition to speak (“one must be silent” if these condition are not given).

Beyond any particular interpretation, in an intuitive sense, the 7th proposition demarcates two kinds of “objects”, a) the one we can speak about from b) the ineffable. Wittgenstein, always very careful in the use of each word, does not write “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one *would be* better not to speak”. He intentionally uses “must” (*muss*), the verb employed for command and rules, that expresses the main idea of obligation.

What does it mean? Using the imperative form “must be (silent)” Wittgenstein has sent an unequivocal message: the speech – the language in use in general – for having a proper sense, but also dignity (moral dimension) *must* deal with some special grammatical and logical rules⁵. Whenever these conditions are not respected, moral

---

³ The *Tractatus* is comprehensive of 526 propositions or Sätze. Some of these – from 6.4 to 6.522 – are especially focused on the ethical theme. The central role of ethics in Wittgenstein’s life and thought is underlined by the philosopher himself in a letter (1919) sent to Ludwig von Ficker, publisher of the “Brenner” german-language review. “The sense of the book” (the *Tractatus*) “is an ethical sense”.


⁵ The role of the rules in language is clarified in three crucial paragraphs of the lectures held in Cambridge: L. BX, 2 and moreover L.BX, 3 and L. CXI. In *Wittgenstein’s Lectures. Cambridge 1930-32*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980. In the Italian version, the one I could examine, they correspond to the pages 68, 69 and 112. Who wants to go further into this aspect of Wittgenstein’s doctrine, ought to read also A.G. Conte, “Paradigmi di analisi della regola in...
rules have been broken too. In conclusion: speaking or not speaking doesn't mean only to respect linguistic patterns, but it refers also to morality. It follows that any right or correct speech (logic) is a good (moral) discourse.

The seventh proposition of the *Tractatus* is based on the proximity of the possibility of saying something (“Whereof cannot speak”) and the necessity not to say anything that can’t be said (“thereof one must be silent”). This moral conception of language is probably due to the Hebrew culture in which Wittgenstein was grown in Wien, a culture based on the Law par excellence, the Torah, where the respect for social-religious rules and precepts played a central role, social as well as ethical and metaphysical. He could be also influenced – as well as some scholars argue – by the Wiener poet Karl Kraus and its doctrine of ethicity of language.

The path of our reflection is now taking us to notice a moral/ethical dimension of the speech itself: it comes to surface with a less than superficial reading of the 7th proposition of the *Tractatus*. Before moving on with our reflection, it is important to focus the proper sense of ethics in Wittgenstein and ask: what did the Wiener thinker exactly mean by using this word?

I. 3. Ethics, morality and logic: the ought of a correct speech

The originally common root of ethics and morality (ethos in Greek means social habits and mos, in Latin, expresses the same idea) is responsible of their use as synonyms, although the distance existing in their linguistic use. Ethics, in fact, deals properly with behaviors that respect social-professional habits and morality is more aimed to the internal dimension of consciousness. With no doubt morality – more than ethics – is deeply related with the concepts of necessity and will.

In the *Tractatus* and in the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein takes the word ethics in the widest possible sense of both:

- a system of moral principles
- and internal law of consciousness, in the Kantian sense of moral imperative

Anyway he shows more propensity towards this second meaning when – for instance in 6.422 T. and in N. 30.7.16 – he talks about “ethical law” in terms of “You must…” and put on theme the problem of “the consequences of an action”, classical topics of moral philosophy in a rigorous sense (as the branch of philosophy concerning principles for right and wrong). Ethics used in the meaning of morality is furthermore evident in N. 2.8.16, where Wittgenstein writes about “ethical judgement” posing the question of what is good and what is wrong: but such a judgement, properly, may be only “moral”, because it is a judgment that moves a moral action.

It is probably to find in Wittgenstein’s own life the reason of the deep correspondence of ethics and morality, where moral rules must be applied in an ethical behavior. Everybody knows how radical was the investigation made on himself: her elder sister Hermine wrote, for example, that Wittgenstein wouldn’t have been able to practice

---


7 For a better understanding of the difference between morality and ethics it may be useful to read the analysis of G.M. Chiodi in the 6th chapter of *Equità. La regola costitutiva del diritto*, Torino, Giappichelli, 2000., pp 69-71. The Italian philosopher points especially out the “rigorous distinction in the linguistic use” followed to Hegel and imposed by German classical philosophy. In *Philosophy of right*, the State is the “ethical totality” (Sittlichkeit), or the morality embodied in institutions. Morality (Moralität), indeed, is a simple, individual intuition of good.

---

http://aparterei.com
Ethics and Language in Wittgenstein. Vera Fisogni

philosophy if he wouldn’t have solved the ethical and personal “problem” of his character. The philosopher, nevertheless, left many traces of his ethical obsession in his notebooks, in the collected lectures and in the Geheime Tagebücher, a sort of manifesto of this moral challenge (“in sich selbst heruntersteigen”).

This ethical attitude goes along with the idea of the role played by grammatical-linguistic rules. “Rules” is a key word in Wittgenstein’s thought after the Tractatus and, in some way, it takes the place of ethics in his following philosophical investigations. It was a natural consequence of the deep relationship existing, in the Tractatus, between ethics and logic (“… only a logical necessity” exists, 6.375). Not only because both these structures of world are shown and cannot be said: moral necessity (expressed by ethics) is the same as logical necessity. The moral imperative (You must) – the basic core of morality – remains at the center of Wittgenstein’s ethics, but it locates good/right and wrong in the language region, not in metaphysical one. This is a crucial point for our argumentation: it means that Wittgenstein tributes the dimension of necessity (distinctive aspect of moral) at least to the language, so that ethics/morality is non ineffable at all, as we argued before. If cannot be ethical propositions (6.42 T) and ethics cannot be said (6.421), the moral imperative (the necessity of a correct/right speech) continues to be part of speech.

We go further. If we pay attention to Wittgenstein’s doctrine, the two propositions 6.42 and 6.421 – that would seem to put the word end on “effability” of ethics – do not deny ethics a proper space. Both statements seem moreover to criticize the traditional values of moral philosophy. By assuming that only the logical necessity exists, the moral imperative “You must” is moved from a field (internal consciousness) to another (language), but the obligation – focal point of whatever ethical discourse – still maintains its integrity.

We have now to solve a problem. Is logic – the character of necessity – the custodian of ethics, too? The answer seems to be affirmative, because ethics and logic present a close similarity, as it comes out from proposition 6.13 and 6.421 (“Logic is not a doctrine, but a specula image of the world. Logic is transcendental” – “… Ethics is transcendental”). We need to stop and reflect. If we consider logic as the domicile of the “must be” of language, we nevertheless should recognize that any speech – that respects the language rules – is first of all a moral behavior, an essentially ethical act. It follows therefore that ethics, in spite of its proper characters (to be transcendent and transcendental) cannot be completely ineffable. In conformity with this conclusion, we could say that any act in which a thought comes to word – of course, when it is logically respectful – should be considered an ethical act.

As we noticed before we don’t see a contradiction with Wittgenstein’s doctrine (in particular, with the propositions before taken in consideration).

• Ethics, as well as logic, can’t be expressed in linguistic terms because its transcendental nature poses (in a Kantian sense) the conditions to formulate a proposition.

• Wittgenstein’s 7th proposition could be re-written in these terms: ethics statement qua talis are not to be said, but it is possible to formulate propositions that possess an ethical structure because of their conformity to the logical necessity and grammatical rules (we are allowed to say what it is possible to say, we are not allowed to say what is shown)

We assert now that is also correct to talk about a morality of language/discourse in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus for the strict link existing between speech/language/propositions and ethics. In fact, although its logical roots, the “ineffable” ethics remains –for Wittgenstein– the center of some absolute values. The “good” –the fundamental


http://aparterei.com
core of Western classical moral philosophy, the aim to which actions move—remains the core of Wittgenstein’s ethical doctrine, although in the sense of a good speech. On the opposite, “wrong” is the ethical uncorrected linguistic action. That’s why somebody is obliged to be silent (imperative with moral implication) when it is impossible to be respectful of any grammatical-logical rules. Italian philosopher Petrosino throws light to the meanings of speaking correctly and may help us to a better comprehension of what has been briefly outlined before. “...in the proper experience of the subject the condition of being loquens always affirms itself according the form of the must be eloquens. From this point of view the subject, because he/she speaks, and speaking has always to choose among the words, each subject is necessary called to the obligation of a “correct speaking” (...) In this sense the act of speaking (...) is for its nature, a moral act”\(^9\).

II. 1 The over-substantiality of the mystic

After having brought ethics back to linguistic region, another problem comes out and asks for our attention because of its structural link with the moral question in the Tractatus. It is the idea of mystic that arises from the distinction between saying/showing (6.522 T.). Obscure and never properly clarified by Wittgenstein in the texts written after the Tractatus, the idea of mystical has been differently interpreted by scholars and still remains a sort of enigma to investigate. Before discussing our interpretation, we would like briefly to remember the features that directly address the mystic, as well as they result from “A Wittgenstein Dictionary”:

- “It is the paradigm of what is inexpressible and shows itself; it is the content of an attitude, experience or feeling; it is the existence of the world”\(^10\).

With no doubt, the idea of mystic is comprehensive of all these aspects and more, but we want especially to underline the coherence of the mystical theme with logical-ethical dimension. We ought to remember propositions 6.41, 6.42, 6.421, in which Wittgenstein writes that the sense of the world must be out of the world itself and ethical propositions cannot express anything higher and located over. The mystical is exactly this higher and over-reality (see 6.432 and 6.44 T.) that is very close to God but it doesn’t identify with God. There is no ambiguity in proposition 6.44: the Mystic is “what” the world is, not “how” the world is; it is the vision of the world sub specie aeternitatis (in this definition clearly resounds Spinoza’s Ethics, an opera well known by Wittgenstein, although not easily understood). It comes that mystic is not a content, an object: it’s a sort of feeling.

But we believe incorrect to interpreter mystic in a religious way or simply as a feeling of the existence of God, although Wittgenstein deeply felt – since 1914 – the influence of Tolstoi’s and Kirkegaard’s thought. The interpretative key of the multisense word is given by the expression higher: it means that mystic is both transcendent and transcendental, as well as ethics and logic (in the Philosophical investigation, he definitely tributes logic the character of a over-order/Über-Ordnung among the over-


\(^10\) See the voice Mysticism in A Wittgenstein’s Dictionary, ed. Hans-Johann Glock, Oxford, Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries, 1996. A recent interpretation, deep and profound about ethics and mysticism in Wittgenstein is given by Piergiorgio Donatelli, Wittgenstein e l’etica, Bari, Laterza, 1998. He has investigated the origin of the ethical attitude of the Austrian philosopher and examine the different phases of the ethical theme from the Tractatus to the last lecture, focusing on the most valuable interpretation of international scholars. The sense of the ineffability of mystic may be read at the pages 79-82.
concepts/Über-Begriffe)\(^\text{11}\). As well as those two peculiar ideas, mystic shows itself but cannot be put into word; it is a fundamental structure of world: the most basic because of its being higher. To understand the world, the readers of *Tractatus* are required to move higher, to transcend and go over the propositions. Only following this way, they are allowed to “see” rightly the world (6.54). But this “ultimate knowledge”, that is also the deeper for human being, cannot be said, as results from the following proposition, the 7th, in which the whole sense of the *Tractatus* is resolved. To go higher – then – it means to see the world *sub specie aeternitatis* and accept the intellectual limits of human being. Here is – probably – the origin of that “feeling” that springs from the mystical vision of the ineffability of the world-structure (logical, ethical, philosophical, metaphysical), that however cannot be identified with the mystic itself.

Wittgenstein’s idea of mystic presents many similarities with the idea of greek *epiousia* (*super-substantia*) expressed in Dyonisius Ariopagitae (or Pseudo-Dyonisius) opera. There is no proof that the Wiener thinker had read anything of this greek-writing mysterious author, so famous during the early Middle Ages, especially for the so called negative way to God or negative theology (we can express about God only in negative terms because of His being over everything and also reason). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the concept of mystical is about the same both in Wittgenstein and Dyonisius (St. Bonaventura called him “master of mystic”) and brings to the same consequences:

1. the impossibility to speak about what is over and higher the level of everyday reality and  
2. the possibility to see the world with a transcendent point of view, that means the have a comprehensive view of the whole in an intuitive form (*T.6.45*), *sub specie aeternitatis*.

Intuition (*Anschauung*) in Wittgenstein’s perspective has nothing to do with Husserlian (intuition of the essence) or Kantian thought (intuition as *a priori* forms of the mind), but – as a way to the discovery of ethical contents – seems to have something in common with Scheler’s intuition of values\(^\text{12}\), although the two philosophers don’t share any other theoretical issues.

The idea of a mystic-intuition of an higher and over reality, anyway, it is closer to Spinoza’s knowledge of the 3rd way and Pseudo-Dyonisius than classical Christian mysticism (St. Juan of the Cross, St. Therese of Avila)\(^\text{13}\). In fact it expresses the idea of *intus-ire* (*to go into* the things) in the reality “as a whole” and brings to light an intellectual, absolutely not rational, knowledge. That’s why mystical attitude requires to do without speech and reason but gives a further intelligence of what is higher and over. As it happened for ethics and logic, it seem that Wittgenstein –with mystic– gives metaphysics a new opportunity. It can’t be expressed with words and reason, but nevertheless it can be reached at least with the intuition.

\(^{12}\) In Scheler’s thought, value is the pure object of an intuition. His moral doctrine may be read in M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik un die materiale Wertethik*, in Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgehen der Philosophie, curavit Paul Good, Fracke Verlag, Bern-Muenchen, 1975, 2nd volume.  
After these reflections, we can read some passes of Pseudo-Dyonisian opera, to have at least an idea of it\textsuperscript{14}.

- The first one is a paragraph of *Theologia mystica* (III, 1033C), in which is very well expressed the link existing between the ineffable and the ascension to the higher grade of knowledge:
  
  
  “… and now the speech, when becomes higher, becomes shorter; and, when the ascension ends, it will become completely silent and it will be one with the Ineffable”.

- In *Divini nomines*, the idea of ineffable is furthermore explained as something higher in an absolute sense (DN II 4, 641 A), in which oppositions are put together in a highest conciliation.

  “Ineffable, what can be expressed with many names, what is impossible to know and perfectly comprehensible, the affirmation and the denial of anything that is over each affirmation and any denial”.

- What is further an higher is the origin, the Cause of everything (DN, I 6-7, 596 C):

  “And, then, to the Cause of everything that is superior to everything, does not suit any name and does suit all the names of the things existing. The name of the Cause is superior, higher than any other name (DN I, 6 596 A):

  “Why do you ask my name? It is admirable. Isn’t perhaps, an admirable name that is located over any name”.

- The understanding of the higher level of knowledge can be reached only with contemplation, that’s to say without the use of ration (DN I 4-5, 592 D)

  “… stopping intellectual activity we run at, for how it is possible, the super-substantial Ray, in which all limits of all cognition are preexisting in a more than ineffable way”.

As well as Pseudo-Dyonisius, Wittgenstein seems to look at mystic as a type of knowledge. The ineffable, in fact, always reveals a cognitive content, although in a negative sense. “What is inexpressible is nevertheless something that can be affirmed in ways that are not the one of the propositional knowledge”\textsuperscript{15}.

### III. Conclusions

As well as Pseudo-Dyonisius did with theology, Wittgenstein traced a negative way to ethics. He argued that ethics cannot be said into words, but his work – especially the *Tractatus* – was deeply implicated with moral themes. This double-faced attitude towards ethics is at the origin of the Bertrand Russell’s intellectual discomfort. Anyway the obscurity of Wittgenstein’s thought, not really easy to interpreter and in many cases highly aporetic, shows a profound coherence with his doctrine. He also revitalizes and brings to the final consequences the premises of classical moral philosophy:

\textsuperscript{14} Dionigi Aeropagita, *Tutte le opere*, traduzione di P. Scazzoso, Milano, Rusconi, 1981. Dyonisian mysticism has deeply influenced the religious and theoretical thought of Middle Ages since late IX century. Echoes of his thought may be found in the masterpieces of Bonaventura (*De reductionem artium ad sacram theologiam*) and Tommaso d’Aquino (*Questiones disputatae de veritate*, I 1, 63 and *Summa Theologiae*). The idea of a God ineffable, whose characters should be said only in an analogical way, has also determined one of the fundamental structure of modern conceptual languages: the apofatic one. This thesis is argued by G. M. Chiodi, *Teoresi dei linguaggi concettuali*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2000.

\textsuperscript{15} Piergiorgio Donatelli, *Wittgenstein e l’etica*, pag. 76
- the Kantian idea of an internal imperative (You must) that gives orientation to will (in W. not reason but intuition of an higher level of reality is what moves will towards good)
- the idea of good and wrong (in W. these two principles are not posed on a metaphysical level because they depend on the correctness or the un-correcteness of language; it follows that good and wrong are not principles external the person, depending on the power of God, but they are in the power of each human being)
- the distinction from ethics and morality (we could say that in W. ethics is applied morality, because the moral rules – grammatical and linguistic in general – have a sense only when they're applied, when they are put in action; W. has outlined, an personally lived, an ethics of making, where doing is more important than any kind of knowledge)
- the existence of an higher level of reality that supports and justifies the lower grade (the mystic, that is given by intuition, allows human being to see what is ineffable)

Wittgenstein’s ethical revolution arises from a linguistic ground. He looks at the world not from the point of view of God (medieval moral philosophy) or from the existential-gnoseological one (modern philosophy). It’s the language at the origin of his speculation: in this perspective, good and wrong must not be seen from other point of view than propositions (the images of world). Immediately it comes out a problem: not everything can be said, because in some way (it’s the case of logic, ethics, metaphysic) the sense of the statement go further the grammatical structure of the proposition themselves. Coherence requires – and Wittgenstein does it – not to put into words such mental “objects”. What could he do? He couldn’t help remarking the Kantian imperative: You must not (put into words propositions that cannot be said). But this way brings to a radical consequence: the impossibility of any ethical-moral discourse. Wittgenstein has solved this apory by distinguishing ethical propositions (ineffable) from the moral making of the language, respectful of a number of rules (this is the speech that Must be said). It follows that morality (obligation, imperative) is first of all ethics: a system of principles to be put in action, in language as well as in life. That’s why Wittgenstein seems “to confuse” ethics with morality. The two levels – internal (morality) and external (ethics, correct behavior) – are moreover two faces of a same reality. Which one? They are structure of the world, transcendent and transcendental at the same time. They both are mystical, in the sense that they are part of a higher and over dimension. I don’t think that moral philosophy, under Wittgenstein’s influence, should see morality as religious. Because mystic is not to be confused with a theological dimension. God does not reveal Himself in the world (6.432 T.). Mystic at least shows itself (6.522). With coherence, Wittgenstein cannot arrive to God if he moves from a linguistic ground.